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Abstract
We show that (L+l)-level linear programs are as difficult as level L
of the polynomial-time hierarchy, even if one only considers problems
with unique optimal solutions.
1 Introduction
Computer scientists have constructed a hierarchy [4] of degrees of difficulty
for problems. At the bottom are problems solvable in polynomial time, a
class now known to include linear programs. The next level is the class
of NP-complete problems, which includes integer programming, travelling
salesman problems, and many others [2]. These first two classes of problem
are denoted by £{j and £j, with an infinite sequence of problem classes ]£j
believed to be of increasing difficulty.
R. Jeroslow [3] shows that the problem of finding the optimal objec-
tive value in an (L + l)-level linear program is at least as hard as solving
problems in the class Y?l °f the polynomial-time hierarchy. The version
of multi-level LPs in [3] assumes that, when a player has alternatives that
are equally favorable in terms of his own objective, he will make the choice
most favorable to the player whose move immediately preceded his. This
is an essential feature of the construction [3, page 149 and formulas (4.2)
and (4.3)].
The possibility arises that the behavior of players in multiple optima
situations increases the complexity of the problem. We show this is not the
case. As in [3], we construct programs whose difficulty is as great as the
different levels of the polynomial-time hierarchy. However, in our programs,
the optimal solution at each level will be unique.
We think the programs here are simpler than previous constructions.
The special case of bilevel LPs that are NP-complete has been given in [l].
2 A Problem at Level L of the Polynomial-
time Hierarchy
Since the satisfiability problem is NP-complete, a common way of showing a
problem is as hard as any NP-complete problem is to show that a procedure
for solving the new problem could be used to solve the satisfiability problem.
We will follow a similar proof strategy for level L of the polynomial-time
hierarchy. [4, Theorem 4.1 (2)] shows that the following problem is as hard
as any problem at level L.
THE SATISFIABILITY GAME: Given a proposition^
logic formula
D lbD2k...kDN [^ = y„iVyn2 v yn3] (1)
where each ym is either a variable or a negation of a variable.
Each of L players chooses values (T or F) for some subset of the
variables. Player j makes his choices immediately after player
j + 1, for 1 < j < L — 1. The odd numbered players are on
a team which wants the value of the formula to be true, the
others want the formula to be false. Which team will win?
We will show this problem can be solved if we can solve (L + l)-level
linear programs. Corollary 2 shows that the L-player Satisfiability Game
may be replaced by an L-player "Knapsack Game" in which the two teams
are trying to control the sum of a set of numbers. The main result, Theo-
rem 4, shows that the Knapsack Game may be converted to an (L-f l)-level
linear program.
Lemma 1 Let G be a formula of the type (1) with variables xm,m 6 M.
There are natural numbers u; am,m G M; and bh,h £ S such that for every
truth-value assignment v : M — {T, F}, v makes G true if and only if there
is Sv C S with
£ am + J2bh = u (2)
{m\v{m)=T} h€Sv
Proof: Results of this kind have been used to prove NP-completeness of
PARTITION and similar problems in [2, pages 60-62] and elsewhere. We
give the construction below for completeness.
For each l<n<JV,m£Mlet cnm = if neither xm nor its negation
appears in Dn . For the three xm which appear in Dn , assign the values 1,
2, 4 each to one of the cnm . Let
N N
am = Y^ 22"cnm u = £ 22n (8)
n=l n=l
For each < j < 7, there are numbers sJt , 1 < t < 4 such that any
number from 1 to 8 except 8 — j may be written as a sum of a subset of the
Sj t . We choose the numbers so that for any j, ]£* 5i* ^ 14. For example,
we may take sn = 1, s 12 = 2, s 13 = 3, su = 8.
For each n let j(n) be the sum of the cnm such that the negation of the
corresponding xm appears in Dn . Thus Dn is assigned the value T by v
unless
]£ cnm = j (n)
{m|t,(m)=T}
To obtain the bh , let S = {(n,t)\l < n < N, 1 < t < 4} and
6( n>t ) = 22
n
Sj(n ) t ,l <t<4
There is an Sv such that (2) holds if and only if, for each n, there is a
W C {1,2,3,4} with
J2 Cnm + J2 SJHk = 8
{m\v{m)=T} k€W
By construction of the of the Syt, such a W exists unless X)m cnm = j(n).
This happens only if v makes Dn false.
Corollary 2 // we can solve
THE KNAPSACK GAME: Given natural numbers u
and Oj,i 6 /. Let I = U/y, with the sets disjoint. Each of
the L players chooses Pj C Ij, with player j making his choice
immediately after j + 1. 77ie odd-numbered players want
52 Ot = w
tGUPy
ty/it/e t/ie even-numbered players are trying to stop this. Which
team will win?
then we can solve the Satisfiability Game. Thus the L-player Knapsack
Game is as hard as any problem at level L of the polynomial-time hierarchy.
Proof: We construct a Knapsack Game corresponding to each Satisfi-
ability Game. Given a formula (1), construct u, am , bh as in Lemma 1.
Let I = M U S. For 2 < j < L, Ij corresponds to the xm controlled by
player j in the Satisfiability Game. Player 1 controls the bh as well as the
am corresponding to his Satisfiability counterpart.
The team that wins in one game will also win in the other.
3 A multi-level LP as hard as level L of the
hierarchy
By Corollary 2, it is sufficient to constuct, for each Knapsack Game, a
multi-level LP whose solution tells which team wins. As in [3], we will
have to add an additional player (player 0) to deal with the difficulty of
simulating a discrete problem using continuous variables. Consistent with
our earlier conventions, this player moves last.
The constraints of our problem will be:
A - B + ^at X, = u
iei
Q < A + B < Xi < 1
(3 )
Q < -6 Di < Xi
A, B > Di < 1 - Xi
Player controls the variables A,£,Q,£)t . For 1 < j < n, player j
controls X,, t G /,-.
The objective for player is
max Q - A - B + ]T D{ (4)
It is easy to see that the unique optimal solution to the problem for player
will make Di = 6(Xi), where 6(t) is the distance from t to the nearest
integer and Q = min{.6, \u — £a,X<|}.
Let c > max{ai},t 6 /. For 1 < j < L the objective for player j is
max (-l)'g - 2' +2 c ^ft-£ 6,X,- (5)
iei, ieij
The D, are penalties which encourage players 1 to L to choose integers.
If the Xi are close to integer, Q will be .6 if X) a%Xi 7^ u (remember the at
are integers), close to otherwise.
The e,- are only used to guarantee that the optimal solutions will be
unique. It will be sufficient to choose e, > such that £ et < .3 and for
any H,H' Clj,
£e,^ ^c-ifJI^jr (6)
i£H iEH'
Our main task is to prove that the optimal solution to the multi-level
has all Xi integer (thus either or 1). Once player L has made his choices,
we have a linear program with one fewer level in which u has been replaced
by u — Ylieii a>iXi. Since the variables are continuous, we must consider the
possibility that this quantity is not an integer, thus we will prove results
about u that are close to integer, as well as integer.
We begin with a technical result whose main content is that the value
of Q dominates the part of the objective due to the et .
Lemma 3 Suppose that X, and X, are integer, with Q, Q determined by
player 0. If S(u) < .25 and Q ^ Q, then \Q — Q\ > .35. Moreover,
{-l) LQ > (-1) LQ if and only if (-1) LQ - £ e,Xt > (-1)LQ - 22 eXl
(7)
Proof: Since the a,- are integer, there is only one value of Z)^t^» which
produces Q ^ .6, and this gives Q = S(u) < .25. The "moreover" follows
from £ e, < .3 and < X, < 1.
Theorem 4 Let u' be the integer closest to u. If \u — u'\ < 2"L~1 J the
optimal solutions for all players will have all X, integer and be unique.
Moreover, this optimal solution will have the same Xt as for the problem
obtained by replacing u by u'
.
Proof: We will establish this by induction on L. The case L = 1 is very
similar to the induction step and we will not give the details of it.
Any strategy for player L with
£ S{Xi) > 2- t-V (8)
ieiL
will be inferior to making X, = for all i
€ 1^. Thus we need only consider
Xt for which (8) does not hold. Let X\ be the nearest integer to X, for
t'G II- Since
K« - J2 a,x,) - (u
1
- 22 *iXl)\ < h - "'I + c 22 HX) < ^~L
we may apply the induction hypothesis to the problem with one fewer level.
This tells us that, once L has made his choices, the optimal solution to the
6
problem for players 1 to L— 1 with u replaced by (u— 53 G»-X»0 will be integer,
and will be the same as the optimal solution if u is replaced by (u'—£ a,^,').
It will also be the same solution as if u is replaced by (u — X)at XJ).
Thus if player L replaces X, by X], players 1 to L — 1 will not change
their decisions. Since
- £ o,*(Ai) + 2t+2 c £ «(Xi) - .3£ «(Ai) >
unless all X, are integer, the gain in the Dt from replacing all X, by X\
outweighs adverse effects on the Q and e parts of the objective for player
L.
We have established that there will be an optimal solution in which
X{ — or 1 for all players. To see that it is unique, note that if two all-
integer Xi lead to different values for Q, the objective function values will
be different by (7). If different integer Xt lead to the same value for Q,
then (6) implies the e part of the objective will be different. Let Xt* be the
optimal solution to the original problem, X, be any other integer choice for
player L, with resulting Q* and Q.
Finally, we consider what happens when u is replaced by u'. Let X, and
Xi be two integral possibilities for player L, which lead to Q and Q. When
we replace u by u' these lead to Q*' and Q'. Each of Q*,Q is either .6 or
< .25. Q* = Q = .6 implies Q*' = Q> = .6. Q\ Q < .25 implies Q = Q and
Q*' = Q' = 0. In these cases, the choice for player L between X* and X
depends on the e part of the objective, which is unaffected by the change
from u to u'. If Q* = .6 and Q < .25, then Q*' = .6 and Q = 0. In this
case L is trying to maximize Q, and .6 is better than 0. The case Q* < .25
and Q = .6 is similar.
We have established that the solution of the multi-level LP given by
(3), (4), (5) corresponds to the Knapsack Game with the subsets Pj chosen
by the players corresponding to {i G 7j|x, = l}. Since the optimal solution
to the multi-level LP tells which team wins the Knapsack Game, this is as
hard as any problem at level L of the hierarchy. However, the winner of
the Knapsack Game can be identified with less information.
Corollary 5 Answering any of the following questions about (3) -(5) is as
hard as any problem at level L of the hierarchy:
1. In the optimal solution, is Q > .3?
2. Will the objective function value for some odd (even) j be > — .3
(> .3) f
S. For every odd (even) j, does the optimal solution have X, < .5 for all
ielj?
Proof: Q will be if the even team wins, .6 otherwise. Since the e
part of the objective is < .3 and the D{ = 0, the second part follows. To
establish the third part, note that the optimal solution for all players on
the losing team will be to make all Xt = 0, to minimize the e part.
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